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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SUH (Republic of Korea)
(Vice-Chairman)

later: Mr. ELARABY (Egypt)
(Chairman)

later: Mr. SUH (Republic of Korea)
(Vice-Chairman)

later: Mr. ELARABY (Egypt)
(Chairman)

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ENGLISH

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Suh (Republic of Korea),
Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

EARTHQUAKE IN EGYPT

The CHAIRMAN: On behalf of all the members of the Committee, I wish to extend profound sympathy to the Government and people of Egypt for the tragic loss of life and extensive material damage that resulted from the recent earthquake.

May I also express the hope that the international community will show its solidarity and respond promptly and generously to any request for help.

AGENDA ITEMS 49 to 65; 68 and 142; and 67 and 69 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS

Mr. SOMAVIA (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): On behalf of the delegation of Chile, I should like to congratulate the members of the Bureau on their election to head our Committee. Their experience will ensure the quality of the results of our debates. Allow me also to thank Ambassador Robert Mroziewicz for his excellent work last year, which enabled us to make substantial progress in the work of this First Committee of the General Assembly.

I should also like to join in the expressions of solidarity with Egypt for the terrible tragedy which that nation has just undergone.

In the past year we have witnessed many achievements in relation to disarmament. There are many examples. The completion of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the Convention on chemical weapons - which will be submitted for adoption by the General Assembly at this session in a draft resolution of which my country is honoured to be a co-sponsor - the

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

implementation of the 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles; the moratoriums on nuclear tests announced by France and the United States; the reduction in strategic weapons agreed upon by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin; and the approval of the reports prepared by two groups of governmental experts on the operation by the United Nations of the Register of Conventional Arms and on the definition of defensive security concepts and policies. All of these are relevant developments in the sphere of disarmament on the world-wide level.

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

It is important also to mention that in Latin America too there have been significant developments in this sphere. The States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco adopted by acclamation the amendments proposed by Argentina, Brazil and Chile; this warrants the assumption that the amended Treaty will enter fully into force in the near future. In this respect, I feel it appropriate to point out that these amendments relate to the improvement of the verification and control system; they improve its transparency as a disarmament mechanism through the establishment of a system of special inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In addition, the region's participation in the Mendoza Accord on the complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons is an unequivocal demonstration of the will for disarmament that inspires the countries of South America. In that connection, I am pleased to note that legislative procedures are under way in Chile's National Congress for approval of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

Aware of its regional responsibility with respect for these matters, Chile wishes to take this opportunity to reiterate the proposals made by my country's Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Conference on Disarmament on 25 June with a view to convening regional seminars in Latin America to publicize the provisions and nature of the draft Convention on chemical weapons and to facilitate the adoption of further measures for the promotion of mutual trust and security in our continent.

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

The strength we derive from shared democratic values and the perception that, faithful to our history, the countries of the region must make contributions to the establishment of new global-security structures lead us to put these initiatives forward again with a view to their early implementation.

We still have a long way to go in the field of disarmament and international security. We are particularly concerned at the lack of a central role for the United Nations in this sphere, the fact that the Conference on Disarmament is not open to new members which, like Chile, wish to contribute to its work, and the lack of political will within United Nations bodies to tackle essential aspects of disarmament. Considering also that conventional military arsenals, although in the process of quantitative reduction, have increased in destructive power, we cannot but feel dissatisfied with the progress made to date.*

That is why my country wishes to make a number of suggestions regarding three areas of disarmament which we feel are ripe for consideration. The first relates to the extension of the validity of the regime provided for under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We are aware of the draft resolution circulated informally by the United Kingdom Government, and we have some comments to make on it.

* The Chairman took the Chair.

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

From the purely formal standpoint, we cannot understand why, if on the one hand the aim is universal accession to that instrument, on the other no provision is made in the preparatory process or indeed in the Review Conference scheduled for 1995 for participation by States that are not parties to it. From the substantive standpoint, the objections to the text put forward by countries like mine - which in our view show that the non-proliferation Treaty does not provide for an effective, balanced and uniform system covering both the situation of nuclear-weapon States and that of non-nuclear-weapon States - still stand. For this reason, the Government of Chile regards as essential universal participation in the bodies I have mentioned, as well as unrestricted discussion of the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime.

A second aspect relates to the Chilean Government's conviction that the time has come to negotiate openly on essential disarmament issues other than non-proliferation, such as nuclear tests. Deterrence cannot continue to be accepted as a valid pretext for preventing a free exchange of views and negotiations on this topic. We believe that recent events such as the temporary moratoriums proclaimed by France and the United States, together with that declared by the former Soviet Union, and the position of the United Kingdom on the subject, should serve as incentives to the process of nuclear disarmament. In this regard, we support the efforts being made by the Chairman of the Amendment Conference on the partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty to facilitate the process leading to the complete and final prohibition of such tests.

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

A third element which should form part of this new phase of the discussions on disarmament is that of the international legality of nuclear weapons. As I pointed out in this same forum last year, I believe that, far from being an element of collective security, nuclear weapons represent a potential crime against humanity. In this respect, my Government wonders how it is possible that the political will should exist to ban chemical weapons, but not nuclear weapons, when their devastating effects are similar.

We have learned that non-governmental organizations and States Members of this Organization are promoting a process designed to seek an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of nuclear weapons. They have our sincere appreciation of and support for that initiative. Meanwhile, we join our voice to that of the Ministers of the Nordic Group in urging a halt to nuclear tests, particularly in the Pacific Ocean, and we call for the temporary moratorium on all nuclear explosions which France announced was to become permanent.

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

The emergence of a new international order necessarily leads us to recall the concept of the peace dividend. As I stated last year, I believe that the true peace dividend is not confined to a problem of allocating the potential financial resources that would be released as a result of disarmament measures. On the contrary, that concept must be based on our capacity to reflect on the problems of peace and security with an open mind, applying modern criteria. The reemergence of mankind's true values with the end of the cold war should lead us to reorient our current political activity in line with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter in this new phase on which the Organization is embarking. There is a clear need to develop security concepts that go beyond the traditional military and strategic boundaries.

There are areas of the work of the United Nations in relation to disarmament that deserve to be highlighted. I refer in particular to the reports of the governmental expert groups. As mentioned earlier, two such documents have recently been prepared, namely, one on the Register of Conventional Weapons and another on defensive security concepts and policies. Their merit lies in the fact that they explore avenues of understanding on subjects on which, in large measure, the survival of mankind depends.

It is an indisputable fact that current economic and political circumstances have necessitated a nearly world-wide redefinition of the scale and orientation of armed forces. Those studies illustrate these issues while at the same time drawing attention to a particular concern of the developing countries, namely, to prevent the armaments discarded in one region as a result of disarmament measures being transferred to other regions - as is beginning, by the way, to occur in practice.

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Chile has many concerns in the field of disarmament and international security. The question of guarantees of nuclear security, the negative effects of facilities with military capability in outer space and their impact on its use for peaceful purposes and the importance of not restricting the transfer of science and technology for development are among the various factors that motivate the Chilean Government's conviction that a new concept of international relations is required, one based on cooperation. To that end, this Committee can make a useful contribution.

In this sense the adoption by the Security Council, at its summit meeting on 31 January this year, of a broader concept of security, and the subsequent preparation by the Secretary-General of the "Agenda for Peace" simply confirm that the United Nations is the appropriate forum for building consensus on disarmament and international security. Nevertheless, we must be capable of abandoning the rigid postures that characterized the Organization during the cold war period, for if we do not, our efforts will be seriously limited.

Mr. LEHMAN (United States of America): On behalf of my Government and the people of the United States, I should like to express our sympathy and sorrow over the tragic earthquake that took place in Egypt yesterday. We join the international community in expressing our condolences.

I also wish, Sir, to congratulate you especially on your election to the position of Chairman of the First Committee. The United States shares the objectives of this effort you are so ably leading, and I assure you of the full support of the delegation of the United States in those efforts. On behalf of my Government, please permit me also to extend a special greeting to those delegations who are joining us for the first time here in New York. I wish you, Mr. Chairman, great success as we all work together to address the

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challenging security and arms control problems that have emerged in the wake of the momentous changes in the international environment.

Few aspects of our lives have been immune from the impact of those changes. Arms control is no exception. In recent years, arms control and disarmament measures have contributed to the resolution of some of the most vexing and intractable international security problems, and we are justified in taking pride in those accomplishments. Today, I will forgo reciting a complete list of those achievements, although this year it would be a sizable one. Rather, I would like to focus on the future and the implications of the changes in arms control to which I have alluded.

Our task is far from completed. We still confront crucial challenges, and arms control and disarmament must play their parts. But one thing is clear: the cold war is over. We are witnessing a profound transformation in arms control, a transformation that verges on a revolution.

Let me begin by making two general observations. First, arms control is everyone's business. An important lesson to be learned from recent world events is that no nation can promote its long-term security merely by seeking to isolate itself from brutal actions taking place around the world. Arms control and disarmament measures, when observed, can help reduce the dangers of such actions. They can also help lower the cost in human suffering when conflict does occur. Arms control and disarmament measures alone, however, cannot secure the peace. Nor can they ensure, on their own, any nation's vital security interests.

Arms control, therefore, must be an integral part of a nation's broader political and security strategy. As such, arms control is not an exercise in international magnanimity, but the product of rational calculation of national interests.

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Arms control is not about the responsibility of others to limit their armaments. It is about the responsibility each of us has to make arms control an element of a policy that serves the goals of global security and stability.

My second general point is that developments in arms control reflect the broader trends in the international arena. Today we are witnessing a clear shift in the global community towards an environment defined by democratic political systems, free market economies, emphasis on the rule of law, and peaceful settlement of disputes. Closely related to those values is the belief that negotiation can help frame solutions to security problems. Another closely related international norm is an increasing intolerance of actions which would, or could, proliferate weapons of mass destruction.

The current arms control process, establishing or reinforcing such international norms, clearly reflects the greater agreement within the international community on what is acceptable behavior among its members. The boundaries of these international norms are becoming increasingly clear. Two years ago, Iraq violated those norms. Baghdad resorted to force rather than negotiation. Saddam Hussein sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction rather than work against their proliferation; he fostered suspicion and insecurity rather than confidence and stability.

And the international community responded boldly. Iraq's actions and their consequences constitute a clear warning to potential rogues of the growing willingness of the global community to act against those who threaten international peace and stability. The cohesion of the international community in the face of Iraq's aggression and subsequent persistent reluctance to accept its obligations is a testament to the strength of the world community's commitment to act together decisively to ensure a better,

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safer world. To my mind, this commitment is one of the most positive and most important features of the current international security landscape.

With these general points in the background, let me explore the changes in the arms control and disarmament arena and the challenges that accompany them. I would like to focus on two changes in particular: changes in the focus of arms control and in the arms control agenda.

Traditionally, arms control focused on the East-West agenda, and on the United States-Soviet bilateral relationship in particular. For many observers, arms control meant, first and foremost, dealing with the strategic nuclear weapons of the two super-Powers. Today, however, with the end of the cold war and with major arms reductions agreed between the United States and Russia, continuing regional conflicts have become a more immediate arms control concern.

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The positive contribution of arms control to the resolution of regional problems is becoming more evident around the globe. Recent developments demonstrate clearly some of what can be done, but they also show how much work there is to do.

One area of concern is the Korean peninsula. During the last year, we have seen important first steps between North and South Korea to address their differences, including arms-control measures. After a six-year delay, North Korea signed and ratified a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). South Korea has long been a party to the non-proliferation Treaty with a safeguards agreement. Seoul and Pyongyang have also signed two important bilateral accords. The first is an agreement on non-aggression and reconciliation which, among other measures, creates a military commission with a mandate to negotiate confidence-building measures and, ultimately, reductions in forces.

The second agreement bans not only nuclear weapons from the peninsula, but also nuclear reprocessing and enrichment facilities. As part of this agreement, North and South Korea are negotiating an inspection regime that would complement IAEA inspections as an important deterrent to any further progress in the pursuit of a nuclear-weapons programme. We urge both parties to continue to work towards implementing the accords.

Here, actions must match words. Effective, reciprocal inspections are critical to ensure compliance with the bilateral nuclear agreement which, importantly, goes beyond commitments of the non-proliferation Treaty. We look forward to the rapid conclusion of an effective inspections regime. Doing so will greatly diminish lingering suspicions and ensure that this historic achievement will be more than rhetorical. For our part, we have made clear that the United States has no objections to challenge inspection of its

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military bases in South Korea as part of a North/South agreement dealing with challenge inspections.

In Latin America, Brazil and Argentina have negotiated an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to place all of their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. They are also taking steps to bring into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and they have signed the Mendoza Accord, which bans chemical and biological weapons. More broadly, the Organization of American States (OAS) at its General Assembly last spring adopted for the first time a resolution calling on all members to pursue arms control and non-proliferation efforts more intensely. We also applaud the creation by the OAS of a Working Group on Hemispheric Security to promote these efforts.

In South Asia, the agreement between India and Pakistan not to attack each other's nuclear facilities is a preliminary step that might provide the basis for further confidence-building measures. We also welcome their joint statement, in which they both agreed to become original signatories to the chemical weapons Convention. But our concerns about South Asia remain high, particularly regarding the spectre of nuclear weapons. The United States has proposed a five-nation conference - to include Russia, China, India, Pakistan and the United States - to start the search for enduring solutions to problems on the subcontinent, including proliferation. While we usefully discuss the range of problems bilaterally with all concerned parties, a multilateral approach could in our view be an important mechanism for finding long-lasting solutions. Given the dangers involved, South Asia has been slow in the development of a meaningful arms-control process.

Another region beset by conflicts with roots deeply embedded in history is the Middle East. Here, too, the changing political landscape has allowed historic steps to be taken on what is likely to be a long and difficult road.

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Here, too, arms control and confidence-building are important parts of the process.

No one is under any illusion about how long the peace process in the Middle East could take or how difficult it may be. For this reason, States in the region and others attempting to facilitate the process support an arms-control contribution that is a step-by-step effort. As a complement to the bilateral negotiations, a number of multilateral working groups have been formed. One working group addresses arms control and regional security. The group has met twice to discuss substantive issues with an initial focus on the contributions that confidence-building measures can make to political stability and the experiences of States, such as the United States and Russia, with the arms control process.

The United States has been satisfied with the progress in the group thus far. We recognize that divergent interests and different priorities are involved. A cooperative attitude that reconciles these differences will be critical to the success of the process as the dialogue continues and the search for specific areas in which concrete progress can be made proceeds.

One might argue that regional arms control in Europe is not new; it has been a centre-piece of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the negotiations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact since the early 1970s. Even in Europe, however, the regional focus has shifted away from the bloc-to-bloc approach of the East-West confrontation to a more inclusive, less adversarial dynamic. At their summit in Helsinki in July, CSCE leaders approved the creation of a new security forum that will address such European security issues as arms-control and confidence-building measures. This forum will also provide the

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possibility for subregional efforts and agreements to be pursued among interested States.

The changing focus of arms control away from East-West or United States-Soviet confrontation to regional requirements has eliminated any false screens behind which those States reluctant to pursue arms control have hidden in the past. It is clear, as I said at the outset, that arms control is everybody's business.

The end of the cold war, however, has also given everyone opportunities. One such opportunity illustrated during the Gulf War is the creation of coalitions or alignments that were not possible in the days of East-West confrontation. During the Gulf War, the military units of 28 nations deployed alongside one another. The important point about that experience is the recognition that States - even when they might be widely divergent in most respects - can cooperate on tough security problems in a shared concern for stability and security. That is a lesson that those who may be tempted to resort to threats or aggression should remember.

One reason that no State can avoid a new look at arms control is that new issues have pushed their way to the top of the arms control agenda, issues that have profound implications for the security and stability of most regions of the world. This is not to argue that the old agenda is exhausted; indeed, many traditional challenges remain. But the relative priority of issues on the arms control agenda has changed, reflecting the new strategic environment.

With respect to the traditional agenda, since this Committee met last year a number of important developments have occurred with regard to strategic arms reductions. First, in May 1992, the Lisbon Protocol to the START Treaty made Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine partners to START along with the United States. Accompanying this Protocol are letters from Ukraine,

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Kazakhstan and Belarus committing each of them to eliminate all nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms from their respective territories within the seven-year reduction period provided by the START Treaty. These three newly independent States have also pledged to become parties to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States in the shortest possible time. We welcome these commitments.

For its part, the United States will provide financial and technical assistance to its START partners to help with the safe dismantlement of nuclear weapons, and we are considering such assistance for missile dismantlement and defence conversion.

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In addition to completing the START Treaty, on which the United States Senate recently gave its advice and consent to ratification, the United States and Russia reached agreement at the Washington summit in June of this year on further reductions in strategic arms. This agreement will bring the number of deployed warheads well below START-Treaty levels: down to 3,000 to 3,500 on each side. The agreement also provides for the elimination of all United States and Russian land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with more than one warhead. We are currently undertaking to put this agreement into a formal treaty form, building upon the START Treaty.

I would like to stress one point. Nuclear-arms reductions must be carried out carefully and responsibly. The nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia are headed towards levels a small fraction of their peak numbers. It is not a simple task, however. While we are moving as quickly as feasible, there are important logistical, physical-protection, safety, environmental and other considerations to take into account. In implementing strategic reductions, for example, it is essential to make sure that no warhead or weapons-grade nuclear material goes astray in the process. Indeed, over the past year, the United States has undertaken an unprecedented programme of practical assistance to, and cooperation with, States of the former Soviet Union to facilitate the destruction of nuclear weapons, to enhance the safety and security of nuclear weapons earmarked for destruction and to prevent weapons proliferation.

It is also important to help the scientists, engineers and military experts whose talents are no longer needed for military programmes to make a

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successful transition into meaningful employment in other areas. The United States itself is experiencing some economic dislocation as a result of major cancellations and reductions in defence programmes and cutbacks in defence manpower and spending. Nevertheless, my Government is seeking to work with the defence communities of a number of nations to help manage the impact of defence restructuring and the conversion of defence industries.

In his statement to the General Assembly last month, President Bush announced that the agency I direct, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, would, inter alia, focus its talents on global defence conversion. This is a challenging assignment that my Agency has readily accepted and will pursue vigorously both through Government-to-Government arrangements and by encouraging the private sector.

The issue of defence conversion is just one example of how the traditional arms-control agenda is in the process of transition to new priorities. Successful transformation of portions of the defence industry into commercially viable entities in other fields is surely central to beating swords into plowshares.

Another area in which there has been great change has been our approach to the issue of defences against ballistic missiles. Instead of approaching the issue from an adversarial standpoint, we are now cooperating with Russia to develop the concept of a global protection system against limited ballistic-missile strikes. In a joint statement issued by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on 17 June 1992 at their Washington summit meeting, the two Presidents stated that they were continuing their discussion of the potential benefits of

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a global protection system against ballistic missiles, agreeing that it was important to explore the role for defences in protecting against limited ballistic-missile attacks. The two Presidents agreed that their two nations should work together with allies and other interested States in developing a concept for such a system as part of an overall strategy regarding the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Another arms-control objective that has moved to the top of the arms-control agenda is the reinforcement of international norms, especially in the area of non-proliferation. Such norms do not always ensure that rogue States will not choose the dangerous path of proliferation and aggression. But they represent the standards of behaviour the international community deems acceptable. As such, they provide the basis on which the action of all States will be judged and the grounds on which the global community will base its actions when confronted with a challenge.

This year, a new international norm of enormous importance has been made available to the global community. In early September, the Conference on Disarmament achieved a true disarmament milestone by concluding its work on the draft Convention on chemical weapons. This has been a difficult and challenging undertaking. All who have contributed to these negotiations, both in Geneva and in national capitals, deserve our gratitude. In particular, I want to applaud the Chairman of the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Adolph Ritter von Wagner, for his leadership and energy in guiding the work of the Committee to a positive conclusion. Senator Gareth Evans, Foreign Minister of Australia, sparked the initiative that helped jump-start the negotiations earlier this year and move them into the

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end game. I also would like to recognize the contributions of those who have chaired the Committee and its various subcommittees in prior years. Without their efforts in helping to build a solid foundation for the draft Convention on chemical weapons, this year's success would not have been possible.

Chemical weapons are not hypothetical. They exist in significant quantities and have been used in combat. They have been particularly invidious when used against unprotected civilian populations. The draft Convention on chemical weapons will ban an entire category of weapons from the arsenals of all participating States. It will help curb the further spread of chemical weapons and bring the collective weight of the parties to bear on any State that seeks to acquire or use chemical weapons in the future.

As a State that possesses chemical weapons, my Government is committed to destroying its entire stockpile within the 10-year destruction period specified in the draft convention. All of the United States stockpile is located on United States territory, and it will all be destroyed on United States territory. Not only is my Government committed to destroying all existing chemical-weapon stocks, but it will do so in a manner that takes environmental, safety and public health considerations fully into account.

The draft Convention on chemical weapons will not impede industry in its normal, peaceful production of legitimate commercial chemicals, including those that may be highly toxic. It is a fact, however, that many common industrial chemicals, and the facilities that produce them, can be used for chemical-weapon purposes. Therefore, verification provisions of the draft

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convention are designed to detect important misuse. Industry verification is focused on those activities that pose the greatest risk. Less stringent measures will be applied to activities that pose a lesser risk. In addition, challenge inspections will provide a means for resolving questions concerning possible non-compliance with the provisions of the draft convention that may arise.

The verification system for the draft Convention on chemical weapons also introduces the concept of coordinating bilateral and multilateral verification efforts. This will help to reduce the direct cost of implementing the verification provisions under the draft convention without reducing the level of assurance provided to the parties.

Article X of the draft convention provides for assistance to a State attacked or threatened with chemical weapons. Article XI encourages the development of peaceful chemical industries. These provisions, as well as many others in the draft convention, are the product of tough negotiations and compromise. They reflect the concerns of both developed and developing countries and provide important incentives to join in the draft convention.

My Government, together with others, recognizes that the draft Convention on chemical weapons is not perfect. Not all of the provisions we would have preferred are reflected in the text. Not all of the positions are in the form we may have wanted. Nevertheless, the United States fully supports the draft chemical-weapon convention. We are pleased with the broad sponsorship of the draft resolution endorsing the draft convention that this body will consider, although we believe that support should be unanimous. When the draft convention is opened for signature next year in Paris, the United States will be an original signatory. We urge others to join us.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

In 1984, then-Vice-President George Bush submitted a draft chemical weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament. More recently, President Bush has drawn the attention of the international community to other pressing challenges. In his address to the General Assembly last month, the President highlighted dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He noted that over 20 countries have developed or are developing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the means to deliver them. Such proliferation poses a serious threat to international stability and security and constitutes an issue that has pushed its way to the top of the arms control agenda. For this reason the President announced on 13 July 1992 a new, multifaceted nonproliferation initiative designed to address this growing challenge.

While longstanding United States concerns about a biological warfare threat have turned out to be well founded, positive steps are being taken to bring all parties into compliance with the biological weapons Convention and to improve transparency with respect to biological research and developments in biotechnology. All States should become party to the biological weapons Convention, and all parties should implement fully the confidence-building measures agreed at the 1991 Review Conference. Regarding verification of the biological weapons Convention, the United States position is well known and has not changed. We are, however, participating in the experts' identification and examination of potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint with an open mind. As part of our effort we have had extremely useful exchanges with key industries, and we would encourage other participants in the experts' study to do the same.

Our ability to deter chemical-weapons proliferation should improve after entry into force of the new chemical weapons convention. It is anticipated

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that most of the States that have the capability to produce the specialized equipment needed for large-scale chemical-weapons production will be in the new régime and will exercise greater caution in their export practices. The norm against possessing chemical weapons will provide a valuable basis for more effective export controls, something that will still be needed for those States outside the chemical weapons convention.

Nuclear proliferation represents a serious danger to international peace and security. We all recognize that the number of acknowledged nuclear-weapon States today is far less than anticipated 30 years ago, but the problem is not solved. A number of possible proliferators have become the spectres haunting the international scene.

The international nuclear non-proliferation régime, with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as its cornerstone, has recently been strengthened markedly in several important respects. With France and China having acceded to the NPT, all five of the States that acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons and the only ones that are designated nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty are now formally parties to the régime. This fall, as we initiate preparations for the 1995 NPT Extension Conference, parties are clearly giving the Treaty a more important place in their security calculations than ever before. The longer the life of the NPT and the more reliable it is, the greater confidence more countries will have that it will serve their security needs and the more effective it will be in stemming proliferation. These are among the important reasons that my Government supports extending the NPT for an indefinite period when the parties make their decision in 1995.

The United States realizes that many factors will be included in States' decisions regarding the future of the NPT. One of those factors will be their

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view of how well the parties have met their obligations under article VI. For our part, I have already detailed our recent successes in reducing strategic arms with the START Treaty and the follow-on agreement. These agreements build on such previous steps as the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - the INF Treaty - which eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. From the United States point of view those successes are a measure of the seriousness with which we have taken and continue to take our article VI commitment.

We can never stop exploring, however, how we can deal with the reality of nuclear weapons in the world in which we live. As President Bush noted in his address last month, to protect ourselves against proliferation that may have already occurred, we are working toward a cooperative system of defence against limited ballistic-missile attacks, a system in which other nations will fully participate.

Another piece of this complex nuclear mosaic relates to nuclear testing. On 10 July of this year, President Bush announced a new United States nuclear-testing policy to reflect the changes in the international security environment and in the size and nature of our nuclear deterrent. That policy contained three main parts. First, United States nuclear testing would be conducted only to evaluate and improve the safety of its much smaller nuclear deterrent and to maintain the reliability of United States nuclear forces. Secondly, the United States would conduct only the minimum number of tests necessary for those purposes. Thirdly, the United States does not anticipate more than six tests per year over the next five years and does not anticipate more than three tests per year in excess of 35 kilotons.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

The President recently signed legislation that includes a suspension of nuclear testing through 30 June of next year. That legislation is now in force. It was not supported by the Bush Administration, in view of its conviction that the Administration's 10 July policy represented the soundest approach to United States nuclear testing. The President stated that the legislation on nuclear testing contained a number of provisions that are highly objectionable and might prevent the United States from conducting underground nuclear tests that are necessary to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent. He also stated that he will work for new legislation to permit the conduct of a modest number of necessary underground nuclear tests.

During this period of testing suspension we will reflect on our future testing requirements and report to the Congress before resuming nuclear tests. In the meantime, the United States has taken important initiatives in other areas that bear on nuclear-weapons-related issues. The United States, for example, has already announced a unilateral cut-off of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. It would dramatically improve the international environment if we were joined in that policy by other nuclear-weapon States, and indeed, by those States whose activities have raised proliferation concerns.

The global situation has already been so altered that it is natural to ask whether the kinds of security assurances the nuclear-weapon States have given in the past are the kinds we need for the future. The President proposed in his address to the United Nations last month that the Security Council reassure any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT that it will come to its aid in accordance with the United Nations Charter should it be a victim of an act of aggression or the object of threat of aggression involving

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

nuclear weapons. This positive security assurance would take on new meaning with all five permanent members of the Security Council now parties to the NPT.

I should like to turn briefly to another area that reflects the post-cold-war arms control agenda. For any arms control agreement to be successful, a minimum of confidence is needed. In regions of the world where arms control has not been frequently pursued, building confidence can lay the foundation for more extensive agreements that limit and even reduce the military forces of potential adversaries. Transparency and openness reinforce support for international non-proliferation regimes. The understanding that comes from sharing information about military matters lends predictability and stability to situations that may otherwise become volatile.

Ranging from hot-lines to information exchanges on troop movements, confidence-building measures helped keep the cold war from turning hot. With the increase in attention to regional security problems, confidence- and security-building measures are increasingly seen as a way to reduce tensions and provide some measure of predictability.

I have already mentioned some important confidence- and security-building measures that States in various regions have put onto the books. Another noteworthy measure in this regard is the Treaty on Open Skies which opens the entire territory of a party to be subject to aerial observation by unarmed aircraft of other States.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

The Open Skies Treaty was negotiated by the members of NATO and the members of the former Warsaw Pact. It is a flexible measure, however, that provides for the potential adherence of all CSCE States, including the independent States of the former Soviet Union. Equally important, it recognizes that States beyond Europe may also want to join the most extensive regime for openness and transparency yet negotiated multilaterally.

Another important confidence-building measure recently introduced by the international community is the "Transparency in armaments" resolution adopted by this body last year and further endorsed by the General Assembly almost unanimously. A major goal of the resolution is to focus attention on what it labeled destabilizing weapons build-ups. The Register of Conventional Arms, as elaborated by the 1992 panel of governmental technical experts, is an important step in this regard. The United States urges all United Nations Member States to submit to the United Nations Register data on imports and exports of conventional arms by 30 April 1993. The work which the Conference on Disarmament is pursuing on questions related to promoting openness and transparency is also important. The United States will therefore support the creation next year of an Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament with appropriate terms of reference to address these issues.

This review of the challenges inherent in the arms control agenda of the post-cold-war era leads me to conclude with a few specific suggestions for this Committee and the multilateral arms control process for the coming year.

First, let us continue the positive trends that have been established in this Committee over the past few years, reducing the polemic and posturing, and treating fundamental security questions with the seriousness they deserve.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

Secondly, let us agree to support fully the chemical weapons Convention from the outset, here at the United Nations, at the signing ceremony, and through the initiation of the preparatory committee. Thirdly, as we start preparations for the non-proliferation Treaty's 1995 Extension Conference, let us resolve to avoid damaging the Treaty in the process of rejuvenating it. Fourthly, as we look ahead to the work of the Conference on Disarmament in 1993, let us recognize that it must address an agenda for the 1990s, not the 1970s. We have serious work to do in the conventional arms area, and there are other issues to which we could give fresh consideration. The Conference on Disarmament also confronts important questions of membership and organization, the answers to which will show how well it can adapt to meeting the challenges of the new environment.

The United States is reducing significantly its military force structure and cutting its defence expenditures to reflect the new international security environment. We recognize, however, that the world remains a dangerous place. Arms control and disarmament can help us to deal with that danger, and we remain steadfast in our commitment to working with all members of the international community to advance peace and security.

The security problems we confront today are not issues that affect the major Powers alone. They are transnational and transregional problems that defy traditional alignments and groupings. They concern political, military, and legal questions, as well as economic and environmental issues. Efforts to resolve them would clearly benefit from widespread multilateral cooperation. The United States stands ready to join in such cooperation during the work of this Committee. We hope all participants will do the same. Arms control and disarmament are everybody's business.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): First of all, I should like to extend my hearty congratulations to you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. I am confident that, under your able guidance, this year's session will be crowned with success. On behalf of the delegation of Japan, I pledge my full and active support. On this occasion, I also wish to express the deep sympathy of my Government and our people for the victims of the tragic earthquake which hit the capital of your country yesterday.

The recent dramatic changes in the international environment have greatly affected the process of arms control and disarmament. Arms control and disarmament efforts have long been centred on United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear weapons. And now, with the East-West cold war having become a thing of the past, the nuclear-disarmament process between the United States and the Russian Federation is progressing at an unprecedented rate with the announcement of a series of nuclear-disarmament measures and the conclusion of such agreements as that reached at the United States-Russian summit meeting in June this year.

At the same time, the issue of weapons proliferation has begun to attract more attention in the international community. This has been prompted by the fact that excessive international transfers of weapons and their related technologies tend to interact with regional conflicts stemming from ethnic or religious rivalries or from territorial disputes which had been effectively suppressed during the cold war period, thus exacerbating the situation. As a result, arms control and disarmament can no longer be dealt with solely in the context of East-West relations. It is now imperative that we take a more global approach to these issues with the participation of all nations, East and West, North and South.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

The chemical weapons Convention that was concluded at this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament is a good example of the necessity of such a global approach. The chemical weapons Convention not only prohibits the development, production, possession, transfer, and use of chemical weapons, but also calls for the destruction of existing chemical weapons as well as chemical-weapons production facilities. The Convention contains detailed provisions for a verification regime which includes destruction verification, routine verification of the chemical industry, and "challenge inspections", which are necessary to dispel concerns regarding compliance with the treaty obligations. A new international organization is to be established in The Hague, the Kingdom of Netherlands, to carry out these activities.

As outlined above, the chemical weapons Convention is a comprehensive multilateral disarmament agreement. It is unprecedented in its scope and, I believe, it sets a model for future multilateral disarmament agreements. Also, the chemical weapons Convention is the first disarmament treaty produced by the Conference on Disarmament since it was reorganized. Thus, the Conference has proved its ability to serve as the single negotiating body for multilateral disarmament. We have renewed trust in and high expectations for the future work of the Conference on Disarmament.*

* Mr. Suh (Republic of Korea), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

Japan, as a member of the Conference, is proud of having participated actively in the successful negotiations on the draft Convention. I wish to pay a high tribute to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, His Excellency Mr. Adolf Ritter von Wagner, Ambassador of Germany, and his delegation for their dedicated efforts, which ensured the fruitful outcome of the negotiations. My admiration goes also to the Honourable Senator Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, who, by submitting the Australian draft text of the convention, played a significant role in adjusting the focus of the negotiations, thereby making possible their early conclusion.

Japan, together with many other countries, is sponsoring a draft resolution on the endorsement of the draft chemical weapons Convention, and hopes it will be adopted by consensus at this year's session of the General Assembly. Japan would like to call upon all States to sign and become parties to the draft Convention in order to achieve our common goal of eliminating from the Earth all chemical weapons, which constitute an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Japan is determined to work towards the effective implementation of the Convention by, inter alia, participating in the activities of the preparatory commission which is to be established once the fiftieth State signs the Convention.

Nuclear non-proliferation is another area which requires a global approach. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the central pillar of efforts in this area, and the enhancement of its universality and effectiveness is of ever greater importance. Japan welcomes

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

the formal accession to the Treaty this year of the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the People's Republic of China, and the Republics of Slovenia, Uzbekistan, France and Azerbaijan, which brings the total number of parties to more than 150. Japan calls upon all countries which have not adhered to the Treaty to do so as soon as possible. We are all aware that, in 1995, 25 years after the NPT's entry into force, an important conference will be convened to determine for how long it is to be extended. It is hoped that all States parties will cooperate with one another so that when they convene in 1995 the smooth extension of the Treaty will be ensured.

In the current international situation, where greater efforts are required for nuclear non-proliferation, it is important to address the issue multilaterally, utilizing the various means available. It is encouraging in this regard to see the activation of regional initiatives for nuclear non-proliferation. Hearteningly, the outlook for progress in Africa in this regard looks promising with recent developments in the political situation in South Africa.

Japan welcomes the prospect of the entry into force for Argentina, Brazil and Chile of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, as it is known, is an example of successful regional efforts for non-proliferation. Japan hopes that similar progress will be made in regions where there is concern over proliferation, such as South Asia, the Middle East and the Korean peninsula.

Japan welcomes the agreement reached at the June summit meeting between the United States and the Russian Federation on drastic cuts in their nuclear arsenals.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

Now that all nuclear-weapon States have acceded to the NPT and have thus assumed the obligation to pursue nuclear-disarmament negotiations, Japan calls upon them to accelerate the nuclear-disarmament process. As the sole nation to have been the victim of nuclear bombing, Japan has long worked for the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons and has made efforts towards the achievement, on a step-by-step basis, of a nuclear-test ban - one of the main objectives of nuclear disarmament. With the recent changes in the international situation, there is a noteworthy trend towards restraint in nuclear testing, as is seen in the Russian and French declarations of a moratorium. The recently enacted law in the United States that restricts, and in fact calls for a moratorium on, nuclear testing is certainly consonant with this general trend. Japan welcomes the decision of the United States Government not to produce fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

The trend in nuclear testing, then, is towards testing weapons with smaller yields and conducting fewer tests. It is regrettable, however, that nuclear testing is still being continued. It is also regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament failed this year to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear-test ban. I hope the Ad Hoc Committee will be established early in next year's session of the Conference on Disarmament so that we can proceed on a step-by-step basis with the substantive work toward a comprehensive test ban.

The work of the group of scientific experts on seismic verification of nuclear tests, to which Japan has actively contributed, remains as important

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

as ever. Japan is looking forward to seeing the final report of the group, which has successfully concluded its second technical test, the Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test II.

The issue of international transfers of conventional arms poses numerous difficulties since it involves many countries all over the world which hold potentially divergent views. Realizing the urgent need to increase transparency in this area, Japan, together with other like-minded countries, submitted a draft resolution last year to establish a United Nations Register of Armaments. To our gratification, the resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority and the United Nations Register was established this year.

In accordance with the resolution, the Secretary-General appointed a Panel of Governmental Technical Experts to examine the technical procedures for the implementation of the Register and the modalities for its future expansion. Japan welcomes the consensus adoption of the Panel's report in July this year. Also in this context, in June this year the Government of Japan hosted a workshop in Tokyo to facilitate a broad exchange of views on various aspects of transparency in armaments, including the United Nations Register system. I believe that the Tokyo workshop made a useful contribution to the smooth implementation of the United Nations Register.

This year Japan, in cooperation with other countries, is preparing a draft resolution to endorse the report of the Panel of Governmental Technical Experts. Japan hopes that the draft resolution will be adopted by consensus and that all countries will participate in the initial registration, which is to be made by the end of April next year.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

Noting the marked increase in conventional-arms transfers in some regions, Japan calls upon the countries concerned to treat this matter with the utmost seriousness in order to prevent regional destabilization. The five major arms-exporting countries are holding meetings on this issue, and Japan hopes that their efforts will lead to the establishment of an effective regime.

Finally, I would like to touch upon the issue of official development assistance as it relates to non-proliferation. In order to gain broader support for its official development assistance policy through greater understanding both at home and abroad, and to implement its official development assistance more effectively and efficiently, in June this year the Japanese Government established a charter for its official development assistance. According to that charter, Japan, taking into comprehensive account each recipient country's socio-economic conditions as well as its bilateral relations with that country, will extend official development assistance based upon the principle that full attention should be paid to the trends in recipient countries' military expenditures, their development and production of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and their export and import of arms. This policy aims to maintain and strengthen international peace and stability, and is based on the consideration that developing countries should set appropriate priorities in the allocation of their resources for their own economic and social development.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

Under the new international circumstances of the post-cold-war era, the United Nations has the potential to play a significantly larger role in the field of disarmament and world peace.

This year the United Nations, with the cooperation of the host States, held three seminars at Katmandu, Hiroshima and Shanghai on security and confidence-building measures in the Asia-Pacific region. Each of these seminars proved to be a successful and useful endeavour, and they served as good examples of the modest and quiet efforts undertaken by the United Nations. There is no doubt that the accumulation of such efforts will foster an environment conducive to the promotion of confidence-building in the region.

Japan is determined to continue its contribution in this field, in close cooperation with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

Mr. MROZIEWICZ (Poland): At the outset, I should like to associate myself with all the words of sorrow at the tragic earthquake that occurred yesterday in Egypt. I convey my deepest condolences to Ambassador Nabil Elaraby.

It gives me particular pleasure to be here again with all of the members of the First Committee at the beginning of its session. My delegation has already had the honour of congratulating the Chairman on his election to that prestigious, responsible and highly demanding office. Today I would also like to associate myself wholeheartedly with the congratulations and good wishes addressed to him and to all the other officers of the Committee.

After monitoring over the past few years - often with astonishment and admiration - the historic developments and changes on the world scene, the time has come to act in order to make our planet a safer place to live. We need to redefine the premises which underlie international relations at a time of transition from a bipolar world to truly multilateral cooperation and a

(Mr. Mroziewicz, Poland)

new world order based on the concept of collective security. Polish "Solidarity" may be proud to be one of the driving forces that initiated this process.

Today, all the major Powers are on the same side, and all of them are committed to peace. Paradoxically, however, the lack of a commonly recognized enemy does not make the security dilemma clearer or easier to solve. With the collapse of communism, the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the replacement of East-West confrontation with cooperation between former adversaries, the perception of threats to the global community has changed. Fragmentation of conflict has followed, resulting, inter alia, in bloody ethnic and religious strife. The problem of security policy today is to identify the threats in advance and to devise means for successfully coping with them.

Notwithstanding all the positive developments, there still loom, we believe, non-military threats to international security and stability. The list is a long one. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Krzysztof Skubieszewski, noted in his statement in the general debate last month, it includes violations of human rights, social, as well as economic and environmental, factors and natural and man-made disasters. We have come to realize more clearly than ever that security and development cannot be separated, that we can meet the unprecedented present-day challenges and opportunities by facing them squarely in all their aspects. In this context we should not forget that the painful costs of transition borne by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and reflected in a dramatic drop in their output will have even more dramatic impact on future world relations if the international community neglects the issue and fails to address it expeditiously. Managing those regional and global problems, which no

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Government can handle on its own, is a challenge for the United Nations in the 1990s. Collective security for the 1990s needs therefore to be constructed around a broader multi-dimensional definition of security.*

We are of the view that sufficient provisions exist in the United Nations Charter to meet the challenges. Since the end of the cold war the United Nations, its Security Council and, in particular, the Secretary-General can work more effectively - and, indeed, they do so. The basic framework embodied in the Charter has to be used wisely, creatively and responsibly. The potential of the Charter is far from being exhausted.

In that system the goal of preventing war must come first. Numerous global problems cannot be dealt with effectively if a reasonable degree of security does not exist. The vicious circle of political conflicts and armaments must be broken. The arsenals and the flow of arms have to be reduced and armaments must be restrained.

Disarmament and arms control negotiations have found themselves at a crossroads. The strategic conditions underlying the disarmament and arms control agenda have changed quite abruptly.

From past years we have inherited agreements on intermediate-range nuclear forces, on conventional forces in Europe, on strategic nuclear weapons, the Open Skies Treaty and documents related to confidence- and security-building measures. All those arrangements have resulted in an essential reduction of military potential as well as in greater openness, transparency and predictability of military activities. In effect, the threat of surprise attack and the possibility of a large-scale offensive action has been precluded in military terms.

* The Chairman returned to the Chair.

(Mr. Mroziewicz, Poland)

Yet disarmament and arms control still figure prominently on the international security agenda in the new global security environment. They are still construed as a beneficial process by definition and as a barometer of political relations. Arms control remains a political symbol that cannot be rejected. And, with the end of the cold war, new disarmament and arms control opportunities have emerged.

(Mr. Mroziewicz, Poland)

On the global scale, it is likely that disarmament and arms control talks will continue in a constructive spirit on the basis of largely compatible political and security interests. Continuation of the disarmament and arms control process will make a substantive contribution to the transformation and improvement of political relations among States by progressively de-emphasizing the military factor in international relations. The elimination of military force as a means of settling international disputes should be the long-term objective of global disarmament and arms control efforts.

The disappearance of an immediate threat of a global military conflict has shifted the security perception of States. Thus, the structure and size of their military forces should be adapted to national defence requirements. The disarmament and arms control process should meet these modified conditions by becoming more regionally oriented.

The handling of disarmament and arms control on the basis of regional security concerns requires that greater attention be paid to the qualitative dimension of armaments. The disarmament and arms control process may help particularly to control the flow of hi-tech weapons and to restructure military forces into clearly defensive postures. Forswearing the use of force to resolve conflicts, a regional approach to the security and defensive restructurization of military forces should be among the long-term goals of disarmament and arms control talks. Our task should be to use the machinery provided by the Charter to harmonize and implement these goals.

The dangers arising from weapons of mass destruction require a collective and cooperative response. The global disarmament and arms control agenda concerns the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons

(Mr. Mroziewicz, Poland)

and ballistic-missile delivery capabilities. The ultimate aim in each of these areas is to eliminate these weapons.

Poland is pleased that the idea of banning chemical weapons has come to fruition in the form of a comprehensive draft Convention successfully concluded at the Conference on Disarmament. The effective implementation of the chemical weapons Convention should result in the global destruction of chemical weapons still existing in large quantities. Successful implementation of the Convention requires universal adherence to the regime. The fact that over 130 countries have already joined in sponsoring the draft resolution on this subject, in my view, augurs well for its success. In this context, we are gratified by the impressive number of States which have already indicated their willingness to become original signatories of the Convention. Given the importance of the issue and Poland's commitment in this regard, the Polish delegation will, in a separate statement later in the disarmament debate, address the question of the Convention and the role of the Conference on Disarmament in a new international environment.

The final stage of negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention has overshadowed the broader disarmament and arms-control agenda, including that in the nuclear area. Poland is committed to the idea of making the world less nuclear. We welcome in particular the fact that in Europe the lowering of nuclear ceilings reflects a lesser relevancy of these weapons to European security. The downgrading of these weapons is demonstrated by the implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) and the START Treaty and by efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear and missile technology. We welcome the START-related agreements between the United States of America and Russia,

(Mr. Mroziewicz, Poland)

Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The elimination of a significant number of strategic missiles under START certainly corresponds to the need to reduce the still-huge post-cold-war arsenals. Even deeper cuts in the numbers of nuclear warheads, as announced by the Presidents of Russia and the United States last June, will certainly contribute to a more stable strategic relationship in the future.

We believe that in the nuclear field the existing legal and institutional arrangements are adequate. However, their effectiveness clearly needs to be enhanced. First of all, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be universally adhered to. In that regard, we note with satisfaction the accession of China and France to the Treaty. We also welcome the adherence of the Republic of South Africa to the non-proliferation Treaty and the forthcoming entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, owing, inter alia, to the determined non-proliferation policies of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. We hope likewise that all of the newly independent States that emerged on the territory of the former USSR will soon accede to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. We note with satisfaction the declarations and steps already taken to this effect. We are gratified by the declaration signed by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States in May 1992. It is a significant step towards eliminating the remaining loopholes in the regime preventing the development, acquisition, manufacture, testing, stockpiling or deployment of nuclear arms by non-nuclear-weapon States. We support the strengthening of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards systems through special inspections and greater transparency in the peaceful nuclear activities of States through enhanced restrictions.

(Mr. Mroziewicz, Poland)

Poland also actively supports international efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of technologies pertinent to the development and production of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. In this connection, we subscribe to the non-proliferation initiative of President George Bush. We strongly believe that the determined non-proliferation stands of States and their wide involvement in international cooperation to this effect would promote a broad exchange of modern peaceful technologies for development.

The unchecked and extensive trade in conventional arms is among the most direct threats to global peace and security. Tremendously destructive fire-power is being distributed to the various regions of the world, giving Governments the capabilities to wage wars against neighbours, minorities, or groups of political dissidents. Hence too, in our opinion, the need for an effective and reliable multilateral arms-transfer regime. It would be not only a positive confidence-building measure, but also a valuable instrument for containing regional conflicts. Such a regime, regulating transfers of arms and related technologies, should be established within the framework of agreements worked out cooperatively by the supplying and receiving States. The parties concerned should be able to monitor all weapons transfers, especially taking into consideration their possible destabilizing impact on regional equilibrium.

(Mr. Mroziewica, Poland)

World-wide efforts to create an effective and verifiable arms-control regime, the latest positive product of which is the draft ban on chemical weapons, must be supplemented by regional measures. We believe that disarmament, arms-control and confidence- and security-building mechanisms developed in Europe can serve as a source of experience and ideas relevant to other regions as well, thus stimulating endeavours at the global level.

As far as Europe is concerned, the Helsinki, Stockholm and Vienna accords in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) have created a solid foundation for a genuine cooperative security system. The Treaty on conventional forces in Europe can be viewed as a post-cold-war peace treaty. If fully implemented, the Treaty will not only reduce significantly the level of the most threatening conventional-weapon systems but also eliminate military imbalance and provide transparency and predictability in military matters. In effect, it would result in the restructuring of armed forces and in placing them in a non-offensive posture.

As a result of agreements in the area of confidence and security building, especially the Open Skies Treaty, European countries have now acquired an unprecedented quantity of information regarding the military capabilities and activities of neighbouring States. However, the degree of transparency can still be extended by an enlargement of the database to include information on logistics, military research and development, production and trade. This would also help check possible illicit conventional-arms transfers. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms should prove to be a useful instrument in this respect.

(Mr. Mroziewicz, Poland)

Specific negotiations on the subject of defensive restructuring and reducing equipment capable of carrying out deep penetration of enemy territory by land forces, are currently under way in the new CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation in Vienna. This new stage of arms-control negotiations will also address the question of management of military technology and of its modernization. Technological innovation cannot be stopped, but since the process of military modernization can exacerbate conflicts, a focus on qualitative issues is well justified.

Before new measures are adopted in order effectively to control the arms race and promote disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, it is imperative in our view for the body of existing agreements to be implemented and universally adhered to. This need is especially pressing, including in the context of ongoing regional conflicts, in regard to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

Poland is willing and ready to make a contribution to these disarmament and arms-control objectives. Our active participation in United Nations peace-keeping operations; in disarmament and arms-control negotiations under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and in other frameworks; in the CSCE process; in subregional efforts, namely the Visegrad Triangle and the Central European Initiative; and in bilateral agreements with our neighbours: all these point to Poland's dedicated action in favour of peace and enhanced security on both the global and regional scales. That is a policy which Poland is determined to pursue in the years to come.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Germany, who, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament, will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.1.

Mr. RITTER von WAGNER (Germany), Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons: Mr. Chairman, your country - or, to be more precise, your capital - has been struck by a devastating, murderous earthquake. Your people have suffered severe losses, not to mention the material damage. Allow me to express my personal condolences.

Let me express my deep satisfaction at having the privilege to discuss questions of world security, arms control and disarmament under your able guidance. Although we miss you in Geneva, we understand that you are fulfilling an even more important task here in New York. I wish you luck and success in carrying out your very responsible work.

I am speaking today in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament. Following yesterday's general report by the President of the Conference, Ambassador Servais of Belgium, I should like to introduce to the First Committee the draft chemical weapons convention contained in the report of the Conference on Disarmament (A/47/27). My remarks will relate more to the draft convention than to the draft resolution to which the Chairman just referred.

Before turning to the draft convention I would like to quote from one of last year's statements in this Committee. Last year, one representative concluded his remarks by suggesting that

"The time has come for a global ban on chemical weapons. After long periods of contentious debate and stagnation, we are facing a singular opportunity. Let us grasp it so that, one year from now, the First

(Mr. Ritter von Wagner,
Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee
on Chemical Weapons)

Committee may adopt by consensus the text of a draft chemical weapons convention." (A/C.1/46/PV.31, p. 14-15)

When I made that statement one year ago - please forgive me for quoting myself - I confess that I was not fully convinced that that would really happen. Somehow I felt I was asking for a miracle. Today, reporting on the results of this year's work in Geneva, I am confident that the First Committee will endorse the draft chemical weapons convention without having to rely on a miracle any more. Due to the extremely hard work of the Conference of Disarmament, we have the draft "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction" before us. One hundred thirty-two countries are already among the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.1, which would endorse the draft convention.

(Mr. Ritter von Wagner, Chairman,
Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons)

The results of the collective effort of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament speak for themselves. There is no precedent for this global, comprehensive and verifiable multilateral disarmament agreement. The chemical weapons Convention provides for a cooperative, non-discriminatory legal instrument to eliminate the spectre of chemical warfare once and for all. The unique character of its contents is strengthened by the consistent application of two principles: overall balance and adaptability to future needs. Future States parties are offered a balanced legal instrument providing clarity on the fundamental obligations and, at the same time, enough subtlety on matters of implementation so that, with the consent of States Parties, the respective provisions may still mature and evolve in the course of future practice.

The following six features of the Convention may be seen as the key components of its overall balance. They may be looked upon separately, but their real significance flows from their entirety. They represent only parts of one single body of provisions, that is, the Convention.

First, the comprehensive scope of general obligations in article I, which, in an absolutely non-discriminatory way, bans all conceivable actions in contravention of the object and purpose of the treaty and stipulates the destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities.

Secondly, the built-in safeguards to deal with situations where the basic obligations had not been respected, in particular article X, Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons, and article XII, Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, including Sanctions.

Thirdly, the very clear and unambiguous provisions on the destruction, including its verification, of chemical weapons and chemical-weapons

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Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons)

production facilities as elaborated in articles IV and V in conjunction with parts IV and V of the Verification Annex.

Fourthly, the extremely delicate and equitable balance that has been established in article VIII in the provisions on the Executive Council, its composition, procedure, decision-making, powers and functions.

Fifthly, the general verification package beyond the specific provisions for verification of destruction. This consists of challenge inspections (article IX and part X of the Verification Annex) and routine verification in chemical industry (article VI and parts VII to IX of the Verification Annex). The political instrument of challenge inspections reconciles the diverging objectives of maximum assurance against non-compliance, protection of the inspected State Party's sovereign rights and the prevention of abuse. Routine verification in industry balances the objectives of reliable confidence-building, simplicity of administration, and non-interference with perfectly legitimate activities in the chemical industry.

Sixthly, the evolutionary concept for economic and technological development as contained in article XI and highlighted in the Preamble. In conjunction with the equally evolving confidence-building regime of verification in the chemical industry, it opens the door to expanded international trade and economic co-operation in the chemical sector.

Having highlighted the key features of the Convention, I should like to guide the Committee briefly through its articles.

Article I incorporates the basic undertakings of the Convention, adding up to a total ban on chemical weapons and any activities aiming at or contributing to their use. The definitions in article II make it clear that this ban extends not only to chemical warfare agents as such, but also to the

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means of delivery and other devices specifically designed for the use of chemical weapons. Article I, furthermore, obliges States Parties to destroy all chemical weapons, including abandoned chemical weapons and chemical-weapons production facilities.

Owing to compromises and concessions made in the summer of 1991, the basic obligations regarding the ban on chemical weapons and their destruction as contained in the Convention are unreservedly comprehensive and absolutely non-discriminatory.

Article II, which defines all important terms used in the articles of the Convention, is particularly important for the purpose of delineating precisely the scope of the basic obligations as contained in article I.

Declarations are contained in article III. Under this article, each State Party shall submit to the Organization, not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force in its case, declarations in particular with respect to chemical weapons, to old and abandoned chemical weapons and to chemical-weapons production facilities. States Parties shall declare, among other things, whether they own or possess any chemical weapons or whether there are any chemical weapons located in any place under their jurisdiction or control; they shall specify the precise location and quantity of such weapons and provide a general plan for their destruction.

Articles IV and V, in conjunction with parts IV and V of the Verification Annex, contain detailed and rigorous provisions governing the destruction of chemical weapons and chemical-weapons production facilities, including verification. Complete destruction is to be achieved within 10 years. Should a State Party, in exceptional cases, for technological, financial, ecological or other reasons not be in a position to do so, the Convention allows for the

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possibility of extending this time frame by up to five more years. Furthermore, in exceptional cases of compelling need, article V permits States Parties to convert, rather than destroy, chemical-weapons production facilities, but only under strict conditions designed to prevent their possible reconversion. In both instances, rigorous additional verification measures are foreseen to prevent circumvention of the basic obligations.

Article VI, in conjunction with parts VI to IX of the Verification Annex, sets forth a comprehensive and graduated routine régime for international monitoring, through declarations and on-site inspections, of activities not prohibited under the Convention, in particular in the chemical industry. The basis of the régime are three schedules or lists that are contained in the Annex on Chemicals, identifying toxic chemicals that either have been used as chemical weapons or are precursors to chemical weapons.

Government and civilian facilities producing small amounts of Schedule 1 chemicals - that is, chemical warfare agents for certain approved purposes such as protective or medical research - are subject to the most rigorous verification measures under the provisions of article VI and part VI of the Verification Annex.

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Industrial facilities producing chemicals listed in Schedules 2 and 3 are subject to the progressively less rigorous measures elaborated in parts VII and VIII of the Verification Annex. Finally, all other chemical production facilities deemed relevant to the Convention fall under the limited reporting and conditional verification requirements of part IX of the Verification Annex.

These provisions on verification in the chemical industry, as they emerged after years of negotiations, reconcile various objectives. They are conducive to enhancing confidence and international cooperation, but are not excessively ambitious in their verification goals. They can be administered with relative ease, and they are flexible and open to future adjustment in the light of practical experience gained.

Verification in the chemical industry aims at steady and continuous confidence building; it does not provide for highly political action to answer concrete concerns about possible non-compliance. However, verification in the chemical industry and the challenge inspection regime under article IX are complementary. The smooth and efficient implementation of verification measures under article VI will greatly reduce the need for challenge inspections, which remain the ultimate safety net to answer concrete concerns about possible non-compliance in industry as well.

Article VII sets forth the general undertakings of States parties intended to ensure the national implementation of the Convention. It also outlines the relations between States parties and the organization to be set up under the Convention.

To implement the Convention, an organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons will be established in The Hague. It will comprise a conference of States parties composed of all member States, which will be the

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principal organ of the Organization and will meet on an annual basis; an executive council, in which 41 States parties will be represented and which will have the day-to-day responsibility for supervising the activities of the organization; and, headed by a director-general, a technical secretariat whose principal component will be the inspectorate responsible for carrying out the Convention's verification activities. The organizational rules of the Convention are contained in article VIII.

Negotiations focused in the last round on the question of the composition of the executive council. Very diverging or even contradicting interests had to be harmonized: the need for a relatively small and effective, but at the same time representative, body; the interest of all future States parties to have a fair chance for participation in the work of the executive council; political and security interests; and the particular interests of future States parties which, having large chemical industries, will be most affected by the implementation of the Convention.

The criteria for membership in the executive council, as they are specified in paragraph 23 of article VIII, balance these interests. They ensure that the membership of the executive council shall be broadly representative of the membership of the treaty. Members of each regional group will decide among themselves on the designation of executive council members for their region, taking into account the criteria specified in the Convention. The regional groups shall also take into account regional factors in designating their members. By using a balanced approach, regional groups are given some flexibility in designating seats within the groups.

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Article IX provides for consultative clarification procedures and, in conjunction with part X of the Verification Annex, for short-notice challenge inspections. A State party may request a challenge inspection of any facility or location in the territory of another State party for the purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance. The request will then be "multilateralized" and the inspected State party must permit the technical secretariat to conduct the inspection and is obliged to grant the organization's inspection team access. However, there are a number of measures available to the inspected State party to protect those activities and installations from undue intrusion which it considers unrelated to the inspection request.

The challenge inspection regime constitutes a novelty in the verification of a universally applicable arms-control and disarmament treaty. Furthermore, it constitutes a politically sensitive concept which balances carefully the verification interests of a State party and of the international community and the interest of the inspected State party to protect sensitive information not related to the chemical weapons Convention. It also balances national sovereign rights and the rights of the community of States parties as represented by the executive council and executed by the technical secretariat.

The verification system of the Convention - in particular the unprecedented instrument of challenge inspections - could become a basis of reference for other multilateral disarmament agreements or for the strengthening of existing verification regimes.

Article X is one of the built-in safeguards of the Convention, designed to protect States parties against the eventuality of the hypothetically continuing risk of being threatened or attacked by chemical weapons. It

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provides, inter alia, for the establishment of a voluntary fund for assistance by the conference of States parties; for assistance through the organization in case of the use or threat of the use of chemical weapons against a State party; and for immediate emergency assistance directly from other States parties.

Article XI aims at promoting expanded international trade, technological development, and economic cooperation in the chemical sector. In this regard, negotiations focused on the question of export controls among States parties. The solution to the issue was found by adopting a flexible and dynamic approach which encourages the progressive removal of existing restrictions, evolving in parallel with the implementation of verification in the chemical industry, thus taking into account the confidence generated by the Convention.

With regard to the pertinent provisions in article XI, attention is also drawn to the following statement by the Australian representative in the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament on 6 August 1992:

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I quote from that statement:

"They" - that is, the members of the so-called Australia Group -
"undertake to review, in light of the implementation of the Convention,
the measures that they take to prevent the spread of chemical substances
and equipment for purposes contrary to the objectives of the Convention,
with the aim of removing such measures for the benefit of States Parties
to the Convention acting in full compliance with their obligations under
the Convention."

Article XII is the principal safeguard of the Convention to protect
States Parties against violations of basic obligations by other States
Parties. It provides the means to remedy any situation which contravenes the
provisions of the Convention. Under article XII, the Organization may require
a State Party deemed not to be in full compliance with the Convention to take
remedial action and, in the event it fails to do so, apply a number of
penalties, including sanctions.

In recognition of the United Nations Security Council's paramount
responsibility for matters affecting international peace and security, cases
of particular gravity are to be referred to the Security Council for any
further, possibly mandatory, action under the United Nations Charter.

The remaining 12 articles, namely articles XIII to XXIV, of the
Convention are concerned with: its relation to other international
agreements; settlement of disputes; amendments; duration of the Convention and
withdrawal of a State Party; status of the annexes; signature; ratification;
accession; entry into force; reservations; the depositary; and authentic
texts. The Convention, which shall be of unlimited duration, shall enter into

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force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the sixty-fifth instrument of ratification, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature.

That ends my presentation of the chemical weapons Convention, which was worked out in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, then adopted by the Conference on Disarmament and, by consensus decision of the Conference, transmitted to the forty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. I am confident that this Convention will inaugurate a qualitatively new era for multilateral arms control and disarmament. It offers us the singular opportunity to lay the foundation of a new, cooperative concept of international security. The overwhelming support already given to draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.1 shows that the international community is willing to grasp this chance and to build on it.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Germany, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ritter von Wagner, for his introduction of the Convention. I should like to seize this opportunity to pay tribute to Ambassador von Wagner's very able and constructive leadership of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee that made it possible to adopt the Convention. Many of us who worked in the Conference on Disarmament on the preparation of the Convention thought at one point, as he said earlier, that it might not be possible, but it was made possible under his leadership.

We have heard the last speaker inscribed on the list for this morning's meeting and before I adjourn the meeting I should like to remind members that in accordance with the decision of the Committee, as reflected in its programme of work and timetable, the list of speakers for the general debate

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on all disarmament and international security agenda items will be closed today at 6 p.m. I hope that delegations wishing to inscribe their names on the list of speakers will do so as soon as possible.

I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. KHERADI (Secretary of the Committee): I should like to inform the Committee that Guyana and Rwanda have become co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.1.

STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF EGYPT

Mr. SHOUKRY (Egypt): The delegation of Egypt would like to convey to all members of the Committee its deep appreciation of the kind sentiments expressed concerning the humanitarian tragedy that has befallen Egypt owing to the severe earthquake that occurred yesterday. We are heartened by the spontaneous concern of the international community and grateful for the many generous offers of assistance to alleviate the consequences of this natural disaster.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.